A Brief History of the South African Defence Force (SADF) 1912 - 1994. Part 3
The South African Defence Force (SADF), a decisive and formidable force, the Border War and its integration into the SANDF (1994)
From the 60's into the 90's South Africa made it's presence felt in South West Africa (Namibia) and Angola, Rhodesia
now Zimbabwe (South African Police (SAP) operations), Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia,
Transkei and surrogate operations and attacks on liberation and other organisations opposed to the South African government
and then there was the attempted coup in the Seychelles.
The South African Defence Force was the thorn in the flesh of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Cubans, SWAPO and
company. It was one among several factors that made it possible for the South African government to negotiate from a position of strength.
Despite the regional animosities, no African army posed a serious or immediate challenge to South Africa's military might
during this time, and its domestic enemies were not well enough organized or equipped to confront the power of the state.
What makes an Army a decisive and formidable force
It is a combination of excellent leadership, discipline, professionalism and highly trained soldiers, outstanding strategic
and technical capabilities. This was the SADF, the greatest army Africa has ever seen
And remember despite the isolation the country faced at the time and the international arms embargo South Africa
manufactured artillery, combat vehicles, weapons, etc that stunned the world. Impressive achievements on African soil.
Images: Left to right. Puma helicopter, the Olifant tank, a Cheetah fighter jet, the G6 and an Eland (SADF Photos)
Examples:
Combat vehicles
Olifant 1A/1B series main battle tank Centurion tanks modernised by South Africa, considered the best indigenous tank design on the African continent.
Rooikat 76 wheeled armoured fighting vehicle.
Ratel 20/60/90 family of infantry fighting vehicles.
Mamba MKIII and RG-32 Nyala Mine protected patrol vehicles.
Casspir MKIII mine protected patrol vehicles.
Various air deployable paratroop and special forces vehicles.
Artillery
GV6 155 mm self-propelled howitzer.
GV5 155 mm howitzer (75) replaced the G4 155 mm gun and the G2 140 mm gun.
Bateleur 127 mm 40 tube multiple rocket launcher.
Valkiri-22 24 tube self-propelled multiple rocket launcher.
Fighter jets
The Atlas Cheetah.Three different variants were created, the dual-seat Cheetah D, and the single-seat Cheetah E and Cheetah C.
The Cheetah C fighter jet was built on the frame of the Mirage III South Africa bought from France in the 1960s. An arms
embargo against the apartheid regime from 1977 to 1994 meant the French fighter could not be replaced. As an alternative,
local experts started upgrading the Mirage's weapon systems and avionics by the mid-1980s, and the Cheetah was born.
The Cheetah programme to upgrade the South African Air Force's (SAAF) fleet of Dassault Mirage III supersonic fighters
was started in 1984, by the then Atlas Aviation (now Denel Aerospace). (Previously, from 1975, Atlas had assembled
some of the SAAF's Mirage IIIs as well as its Mirage F1s.) At that time, South Africa operated Mirage IIICZ (Z being the
suffix indicating that the aircraft were manufactured for the SAAF), IIIBZ, IIIDZ, IIID2Z, IIIE, IIIRZ and IIIR2Z versions.
Impala MK1 Combat Jet
The Impala built under license in South Africa was in fact an Italian designed jet Aermacchi MB326
Helicopters
Puma
Allouette
The Border War
The South African government and the SADF's involvement in what is termed the Border War(1966-1989)
The Border War refers to the conflict that took place in South-West Africa ( Namibia) and Angola.
"No one likes to be at the constant merry and whim of a bully. Yet bullying tactics were the centerpiece of SWAPO's
revolutionary program for Namibia. The only thing a bully understands and respects is force."
Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy by Morgan Norval
Where it all started
In World War I South African forces under command of General Louis Botha invaded the former German protectorate
of South West Africa (Namibia). South Africa then received a mandate to administer the territory it has secured for the Allied forces.
Irrespective of the claims that South Africa was now responsible to the United Nations as far as the administration
of South West Africa was concerned Prime minister, Dr Malan stated in 1948 that "we regard South West Africa
as an integral portion of South Africa. The government of the day then introduced certain policies such as:
1954, blacks in South West Africa were from now on placed under authority of the SA minister of Native Affairs;
1968, the entire administration of that country was taken over by the different administrative departments of
South Africa; And the controversial homelands policy was extended to South West Africa.
In 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nations made it clear that South Africa has no longer the right to
administer the territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United
Nations. In 1969 the United Nations passed another resolution in which it calls upon the government of South Africa
to withdraw it's administration from South West Africa. However in real terms there was nothing the United Nations
could do to force South Africa to comply.
During this period, on May 31,1961 South Africa became the Republic of South Africa. Two years earlier, in April 1959,
the Ovamboland Peoples Organisation (OPO) was formed. 10 Years later it became the South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO).
SWAPO upset by South Africa's presence in South West Africa turned aggresive. Under the leadership of Sam
Nujoma, began a more intense guerrilla campaign. The organization began to operate from Zambia and later (1975) from neighbouring Angola. In that year the SADF arrived in SWA.
South West Africa infiltrated by the enemy
In 1965 the first infiltration by armed insurgents of PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia) took place over the
border of Southern Angola/Namibia, and set in motion what was to become a war lasting 23 years and ultimately
involving not only Namibians and South Africans, but also Angolans, Cubans, Russians and Americans.
Border violations by SWAPO, intimidation of and attacks on local people left the police with no other option but to
react swiftly against any terrorist infiltration SWAPO increasingly faced well trained forces in the process:
*Commandos specially trained in counterinsurgency warfare;
*S.A. paratroopers - 1 Para Batt. In 1966, they participated, with the Police, against terrorist insurgents in S.W.A.;
*The SADF which arrived in that country in 1974 to assist the police;
*A reserve force;
*Bushmen trackers in the Caprivi Strip (31 Battalion);
*33 Battalion in the Eastern Caprivi;
*34 Battalion in Kavangoland;
*35 Battalion in Owamboland;
*36 Battalion in Bushmanland;
*41 Battalion in Windhoek and so on;
*The reconnaissance forces, or "recces."
*A Namibian specialist unit was formed to train the infantry in tracking, the use of dogs as trackers, as
well as using horses and dirt-bike motorcycles for rapid deployment and patrol work in the bush....
*And then there was Koevoet. Statistics have it that from its inception until the end of 1988 the unit had killed at least 3,000 SWAPO insurgents.
In the year 1980 all military units created in South West Africa became part of the newly formed South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF).
These units and the tactics they used were highly successful. It prevented SWAPO from infiltrating Namibian
terroritary effectively and as a result seriously jeopordizing their strategies and objectives.
Cross-border operations by the SADF against both SWAPO and FAPLA
The reason for the cross-border operations
SWAPO camps and bases were located inside Angola. By 1978, after the withdrawal of the SADF., SWAPO,
supported by FAPLA forces, established a presence in southern Angola, especially at Xangongo, Ongiva,
Ongwa and Cassinga, thus threatening S.W.A. Xangongo and Ongiva were key bases from where they
conducted operations in Kaokoland, in western and central Ovamboland, in central and eastern Ovamboland and in the Kavangoland.
Some of the operations conducted in Angola by the security forces:
Operation Reindeer: the attacks on Cassinga and Chetequera camps (4 May 1978).
There were also attacks on a number of SWAPO facilities in and around Chetequera (an area known by SWAPO as "Vietnam").
Operation Sceptic began as a lightning attack on a SWAPO base complex called ‘Smokeshell (June 1980).
Operation Protea - destruction of PLAN headquarters at Xangongo and Ngiva (August 1981).
Operations Daisy in 1981, Super and Meebos (1982), Phoenix and Askari (1983), December 1983 Operation Askari Boswilger (1985),
Modulêr and Hooper (1987–88), Packer and Displace (1988)
The enemy suffered enormously
In all these operations targeted at SWAPO and essential Angola fascilities (petroleum, etc) reports read:
the enemy suffered great losses, defeats, casualties, destruction of towns, SWAPO/FAPLA bases and camps
destroyed, the enemy will take a long time to recover, the enemy driven from the border deeper into Angola, enemy
operations and logistical support and command and control capabilities disrupted, etc.
The Border war and Cuito Cuanavale
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was fought intermittently between August 14, 1987 and March 23, 1988, south and east of the town of Cuito Cuanavale, Angola.
Cuito Cuanavale to the South African Defence Force took the form of four phases, which ran consecutively as a single overall battle. These were:
Operation Moduler – The aim of which was to halt and reverse the FAPLA advance on the UNITA strongholds of Mavinga and Jamba.
On 4 August 1987 the SADF launched Operation Moduler, which was to stop the Angolan advance on Mavinga to prevent a rout of UNITA. The SADF 61 Mechanized Battalion
crossed into Angola from their base at the border town of Rundu.
*Chester Crocker wrote:
"In early October the Soviet-Fapla offensive was smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga. It turned into a headlong
retreat over the 120 miles back to the primary launching point at Cuito Cuanavale. In some of the bloodiest battles of the
entire civil war, a combined force of some 8,000 Unita fighters and 4,000 SADF troops destroyed one Fapla brigade and
mauled several others out of a total Fapla force of some 18,000 engaged in the three-pronged offensive.
Estimates of Fapla losses ranged upward of 4,000 killed and wounded. This offensive had been a Soviet conception from start to finish. Senior
Soviet officers played a central role in its execution. Over a thousand Soviet advisers were assigned to Angola in 1987 to
help with Moscow's largest logistical effort to date in Angola: roughly $1.5 billion in military hardware was delivered that year.
Huge quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or fell into Unita and SADF hands when Fapla broke into a disorganized retreat...
The 1987 military campaign represented a stunning humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its strategy.
It would take Fapla a year, or maybe two, to recover and regroup. Moreover the Angolan military disaster threatened to go
from bad to worse. As of mid-November, the Unita/SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale airfield and pinned down
thousands of Fapla's best remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive perimeters."
HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA -Crocker, pp.360-361
Operation Hooper – The aim of which was to inflict maximum casualties on the retreating FAPLA forces after they had been halted, to ensure there were no further attempts to resume the advance.
By November, the SADF had cornered the remnants of three FAPLA units on the east of the Cuito River, across from the town itself and was poised to destroy them.[18] The quite demoralised
59th FAPLA motorised infantry brigade, 21st and 25th FAPLA light infantry brigades, in positions near Tumpo and east of the Cuito River, were effectively cut off due to SADF artillery control of
both the bridge and airstrip and to UNITA guerrilla control of the road from Menongue, which they had mined and were prepared to ambush. With no functioning armour or artillery remaining,
the FAPLA units faced annihilation.
On 15 November, the Angolan government requested urgent military assistance from Cuba. In Fidel Castro's view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and
the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. Thus, Castro responded immediately by sending — in
what was called "Maniobra XXXI Aniversario de las FAR" — materiel and 15,000 elite troops, retaking the initiative from the Soviets. The first Cuban reinforcements in Cuito arrived by
helicopter on 5 December with about 160 – 200 technicians, advisers, officers, and special forces.
On 13 January the SADF attacked the 21st brigade, starting with air strikes and artillery bombardments. Over two days the FAPLA unit was driven out of their positions, and lost 7 tanks with
5 more captured, various other vehicles destroyed and captured, and 150 men dead or captured. UNITA lost 4 dead and 18 wounded, and the SADF had one man wounded and one armoured vehicle damaged.
The next attack was only on 14 February, against the positions of 21st brigade that UNITA had lost, and the neighbouring positions of the 59th brigade. They were counter-attacked by Cuban tanks.
Both 21st brigade and 59th brigade were forced to withdraw. The FAPLA lost 500 men and a further 32 Cuban soldiers, along with 15 tanks and 11 armoured vehicles. The SADF had 4 killed and 11 wounded,
plus some vehicles damaged.
In a skirmish on 19 February a FAPLA position was disrupted, and it resulted in the FAPLA 59th brigade being withdrawn across the river. However the SADF had two vehicles damaged in the minefield.
In the following days the Cubans stepped up their air attacks against South African positions. On 25 February another assault on the bridgehead ran into a minefield, and bogged down. FAPLA lost 172 men,
plus 10 Cubans, and 6 tanks. The SADF lost 4 killed and 10 wounded, plus several vehicles damaged.
Operation Packer – The aim of which was to force the FAPLA forces to retreat to the west of the Cuito River, and to provide UNITA with a sustainable self-defence.
Operation Displace – The aim of which was to maintain a deterrence to any resumed advance against UNITA, while the bulk of the troops and equipment were withdrawn.
A small SADF force continued to harry the FAPLA in the Tumpo region, to create the impression that the full force was still present, and to prevent the FAPLA from resuming their advance against UNITA.
For months it continued to shell Cuito Cuanavale and the airstrip across the river using their long-range G-5 artillery from a distance of 30 to 40 km.
Losses of the enemy at Cuito Cuanavale
Tanks destroyed: Cuba/Fapla 94, SADF 3
Troop carriers destroyed: Cuba/Fapla 100, SADF 5
Logistical vehicles destroyed: Cuba/Fapla 389, SADF 1
Soldiers injured: Cuba/fapla 1800, SADF 280
Soldiers killed: Cuba/Fapla 4 785, SADF 31.
Just over a billion Rand in soviet equipment destroyed or captured
As a result of this battle the Cuban commander, Genl Arnaldo Oshoa Sanchez and a “Hero of the Republic of Cuba’
was executed by a firing squad on his return. (Ex chief of the Defense Force, Genl Jannie Geldenhuys in reaction to the Cuban/ANC claims).
Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Angola between November
1987 and January this year – the man, in other words, sent in to clean up the mess after Unita and the SADF had thrashed
the MPLA and its Soviet advisers at Mavinga – was executed on charges, principally, of attempting to smuggle cocaine to
the US in cahoots with Columbia’s notorious Medellin cartel.
Or so at least the Cuban people and the world have been asked to believe. The transcripts of those sections of Ochoa’s
"trial" that were broadcast on Cuban television, and other evidence, suggest that the truth is rather different. The general
may, tangentially, have been involved in the drug trade, but that was not the reason for his arrest and liquidation.
Ochoa, according to those who knew him (including diplomats involved in the Angola/Namibia settlement process), was
a man of striking countenance and much intelligence and charisma.
He knew his mission was to preside over Cuba’s last hurrah in Angola and that the "heroic" defence of Cuito was, therefore,
a vainglorious fraud, designed to cover a retreat that had already been decided. The 15 000 new troops who followed Ochoa came to save Cuban face, not the MPLA.
Defence Minister Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, quoted the general as saying: "I have been sent to a lost war so that I will be blamed for the defeat." That was, indeed, his view.
Peace negotiations and withdrawl of South African Forces
Before and during the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, US-brokered peace negotiations were in progress to remove all foreign belligerents from Angola. This was linked to the attempt to secure independence for Namibia.
After the battles all sides resumed negotiations.
While negotiations continued, Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO units under General Cintras Frías opened a second front to the west at Lubango with a force of 40,000 Cuban troops and 30,000
Angolan forces,and with support from MiG-23 fighter bombers. Various engagements took place over the next three months, starting near Calueque on 15 March 1988.
This eventually gave rise to Operation Excite/Hilti and Operation Displace, in which skirmishes took place in Donguena, Xangongo, Techipa and other cities. The battles in the Southwest front
ended on 27 June when Cuban MiG-23s bombed Calueque Dam, causing the last South African loss of life in the conflict when they killed 12 soldiers from 8 SAI. Just before the air attack
over Calueque, a heavy combat happened in the area when 3 columns of the FAPLA/FAR forces advanced towards Calueque dam. SADF forces, composed of regulars,
32 Bn and SWATF troops, halted the Cuban offensive inflicting approximately 300 casualties among the enemy forces.
The Cubans claimed to have killed 20 SADF troops, but the clash discouraged the Cubans from undertaking further ground engagements.
On 8 June 1988, the South African government responded by mobilising 140,000 reservists—a figure almost unprecedented in SADF history—and threatening severe
repercussions on any Cuban unit which crossed the border. however when hostilities ceased the call-up was cancelled.
Following the battles the South Africans recognised that further confrontation with the Cubans would unnecessarily escalate the conflict and with all risks considered then retired the combat
groups still operating in Angola back to Namibia.
On the other side, the Cubans were shocked at the heavy casualties suffered and placed their forces on maximum alert awaiting a revenge attack from the South Africans, which never came.
With the withdrawal of the SADF into Namibia on 27 June (The SWATF, 701Bn, A-Coy, Platoons 1 and 2, who were dug in, in defensive positions on the hills North East of Calueque,
finally withdrew over the small lower, Calueque bridge on 29 June, and at Ruacana the last elements, 32Bn and tanks, withdrew on 30 June) the hostilities ceased,and a formal
peace treaty was signed at Ruacana on 22 August 1988. A peace accord, mediated by Chester Crocker, was finally signed on 22 December 1988 in New York, leading to the withdrawal
of all foreign belligerents and to the independence of Namibia.
Three days after the US election (1988) the parties reconvened in Geneva and within the week had agreed to a phased Cuban withdrawal over the course of twenty seven months.
In exchange, South Africa pledged to begin bestowing independence on South West Africa by 1 November 1989.On 13 December, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed the Brazzaville
Protocol, which affirmed their commitment to these conditions and set up a Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC) to supervise the disengagement in Angola.The JMMC was to
include Soviet and US observers.All hostilities between the belligerents, including PLAN, were to formally cease by 1 April 1989.On 22 December, the Brazzaville Protocol was enshrined
in the Tripartite Accord, which required the SADF to withdraw from Angola and reduce its troop levels in South West Africa to a token force of 1,500 within twelve weeks.Simultaneously,
all Cuban brigades would be withdrawn from the border to an area north of the 15th parallel. At least 3,000 Cuban military personnel would depart Angola by April 1989, with another
25,000 leaving within the next six months.The remaining troops would depart at a date not later than 1 July 1991. An additional condition was that South Africa would cease all support for UNITA,
and Angola likewise for PLAN and MK.
On 20 December, United Nations Security Council Resolution 626 was passed, creating the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to verify the redeployment northwards and
subsequent withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola.UNAVEM included observers from Western as well as non-aligned and communist nations. In February 1989 the
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was formed to monitor the South West African peace process.
General elections under a universal franchise were held in South West Africa between 7 and 11 November 1989, returning 57% of the popular vote for SWAPO. This gave the party
41 seats in the territory's Constituent Assembly, but not a two-thirds majority which would have enabled it to impose a unilateral constitution on the other parties represented.
South West Africa formally obtained independence as the Republic of Namibia on 21 March 1990.
The SADF replaced
The military SANDF as it exists today was created in 1994, following South Africa's first post-apartheid national elections and the adoption of a new constitution. It replaced the
South African Defence Force and also integrated uMkhonto we Sizwe guerilla forces.
Comments and Remarks
*The SADF....the best of the best, gone but not forgotten.
*A lot can be said of the apartheid era defense force and the way they destabilized the neighbouring states. But they were a prime example of a highly disciplined force.
*The old SADF was one of the best in the world.
*The SADF does not exist anymore, as for the SANDF who succeeded them, I have not the faintest idea of what they are
capable or incapable of, what I can say with fair degree of confidence is that they are not, and never will be, in the same leaque as the SADF.
Sources
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/South%20African%20Army - SA Army through history
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/army.htm - Brief history of the SA Army
Military history of South Africa
South African Defence Force (Wikipedia)
South African Border War (Wikipedia)
Battle of Cuito Cuanavale (Wikipedia)
SADF Photos
OPERATIONS MODULER AND HOOPER (1987-1988)
Castro explains why Angola lost battle against the SADF
SHORT HlSTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRlCAN ARMY
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE SADF'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT Over a year after the secrecy
surrounding Op Savannah had led to propaganda victories for the communists, the SADF released this account to reveal
the actual course of events.
How Washington Lost its Nerve and how the Cubans subdued Angola The author, Robert Moss, shows that the United
States, having begged South Africa to put troops in to offset the Communist intervention, lost its nerve and failed to
stop the great build-up of men, guns and aircraft from across the seas, which had started, trucked right across the
African continent, way back in 1964.
HOW SOUTH AFRICA TOOK ON CASTRO'S INVADERS
Battle of Death Road
MOSCOW’S NEXT TARGET IN AFRICA What the Russians learned from Angola is that war by proxy pays off.
The Battle of Bridge 14 An account of a major defeat of the communist forces in Angola during Operation Savannah.
The South African bushwar 1966 - 1989